Sunday, 23 August 2026

The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (Book review)

The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic

A Witness to the Spanish Civil War

By Henry Buckley

Published by I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd

ISBN: 978-1-78076-931-8

Paperback, 432 pages

Henry Buckley was an English journalist who was first sent to Spain in 1929 and stayed there during the years leading up to and through the Spanish Civil War. As a journalist he got to know personally and interview some of the main political and military figures of the period; he also got to see first hand military coup which led to the end of the Spanish Republic on April 1st 1939.

I have to admit I was unfamiliar with the author and this title before opening the covers; the introduction by that luminary and stalwart writer on all things SCW related: Paul Preston did intrigue me quite a bit. The book was originally published in London in 1940, but the warehouse was destroyed during the blitz and almost every copy burned and destroyed; it was only some 70 years later it had been finally reprinted and has now become available.

The writer has an easy style with a dry wit, which makes this book an easy read. I have to say I was continually impressed how even though he obviously sympathised with the Republic, he writes with an even hand when it comes to the bravery shown by both sides in battle. He also writes with great passion about the plight and suffering of the ordinary Spaniard, which brings home the real cost of war to the reader.

To be 100% honest if you are purely a wargamer with little interest in the Civil War beyond the factions, armies and equipment, you may find this book not for you. But if you want to know more about the politics (both internal and world views); get a first hand glimpse into what was happening to the ordinary people on the streets of Madrid or Barcelona, there is a lot to recommend.

The author does in my opinion highlight the real reasons behind the success of the 1936 rebellion. More than just the aid given to the rebels by Germany, Italy (and to a lesser extent Portugal)! It was the lines of credit opened to the rebels by financial institutions and big business allowing them access to oil, petrol other commodities, this was then enhanced by the disinterest of Britain and France! The author goes to great pains to illustrate how when challenged, British and French officials (both military and civil) would shrug and say that in the case of a civil war - "they had to side with their class". Both countries turned a blind eye to German and Italian ships transporting military equipment to the rebels whilst stopping and searching vessels carrying suspect cargoes for the Republic!! The French closed their borders preventing military equipment to be transported into the Republic even though that Republic was the legitimate government!! The author certainly believed this equipment and at least a more even handed approach to the non-intervention treaty could have made a huge difference for the Republic.

Obviously we as readers have now had some ninety years and numerous books and documentaries on the Civil War which gives us a far wider knowledge base about the war than Buckley had when he wrote this in 1939. So we can find some errors in the text and some oversights, which our man on the ground could not have known - myself I don`t think these detract from the book.

The end of the book is quite sad where he describes the conditions in the refugee camps along the beaches at Saint-Cyprien and San Argeles sur Mer. I stayed in Argeles some twenty-three years ago with my family, the old Spanish cemetery was a very sad place indeed 😞

Highly recommended.

10 comments:

  1. Thanks for the review. Sadly I don’t think this book is one for me - my bookshelves are heaving and I really, really need to just buy titles that I actually need (rather than just because “that would be nice”). Of course, I still need to organise the books into some sort of order…
    Cheers,
    Geoff

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    1. I was lucky enough to pick up 3 new titles (including this one) for FREE off a guy clearing his father`s attic, just cost me postage. What this book did prove is how much Antony Beevor is just a plagiarist when it comes to writing books!! So much of his opus "The Battle for Spain" is stolen directly from this, Hugh Thomas` volume and those by Paul Preston - very sad......

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    2. Here in the UK we’ve had a “bit of a to do” recently regarding accusations of plagiarism. I’m sure you can guess the actual reference, so I’ll say no more…

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    3. Yes I follow the news :) I`ve had a low opinion of Beevor for quite a while, I linked his book to Thomas and Preston, but after reading this one, my general impression was confimred - Beevor is more an editor than a writer IMHO.

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  2. Another example of contemporary accounts being published is James Cortada, ed., "Modern warfare in Spain: American military observations on the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939" (Potomac Books, 2012). And in more recent years we've also seen really useful work on the Civil War's naval side, drawing on archival sources: Michael Alpert's "The Spanish Civil War at sea: dark and dangerous waters" (Pen & Sword, 2021) and Leonard Heinz's "The fleet that fought itself: the Spanish Navy and the Civil War 1936-39" (Seaforth, 2025).

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    1. Thank you for your input, the naval side of the war has always been too one-sided to catch my wargamer interest, though I have written a couple of short pieces and own Paul Heaton`s "Spanish Civil War Blockade Runners". I`m not familiar with any of the titles you mention, which side were the American observers on??

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    2. [i] The US observers were e.g. military attaches, so not "on" either side, though of course such officers may have had personal preferences, or have had greater access to one side's story.
      [ii] As you note, there was an unbalanced aspect to the naval side: the Nationalists had the sympathy of most officers; the Republic had most of the most modern ships (i.e. destroyers), though apparently with relatively few torpedoes, thus constraining their activity. The Nationalists were able to complete several ships under construction, and Italy passed them some destroyers and submarines (though, from memory, not particularly good ones).
      [iii] James Matthews' "Reluctant warriors: Republican Popular Army and Nationalist army conscripts in the Spanish Civil War "(OUP, 2012) notes that both sides made a good show of creating mass armies out of conscription, but that the Nationalists were more effective at it: "Thousands of former Republican soldiers [who had been taken prisoner] donned Nationalist uniforms and fought as effectively as they had done for the government...The Nationalist ability to ensure the participation of even recalcitrant combatants [through systems of rewards as well as possible punishments] was an important advantage over government forces..." It would seem that the Nationalists were also more effective at training sailors to man their growing navy.
      [iv] Something that's apparent from the small but growing number of accounts of the naval aspects of the SCW, is that both sides used auxiliary warships (armed trawlers, armed merchant cruisers...) in numbers.

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    3. Thank you, 1. I miss-understood "miltary observers", and had not considered actual serving military or government officials. It seems pretty clear that most US industrialists supported Franco, Ford is quoted as saying "Franco owes me a great debt, without my help his army couldn`t move". Ford, Chevy and GM supplied the Rebels with at least 1,000 trucks on credit and Amerco at the start of the coup redirected tankers already at sea and paid for by the Republic to Rebel held ports! During the rest of the war they continued to supply oil and petrol on credit to Franco without limit. The US attitude to the conflict (volunteers aside) seems to have been to support the Rebels over the legitimate democratic government! 2. The Republic`s navy suffered from a lack of trained officers, due to many joining the coup and those that did not being misstrusted and removed from command by their men or the Republic. A group of individuals without correct training and clear command cannot be expected to compete in ship vs ship actions. There is a short article on here about Jupitar Class Minelayers where the Rebels completed construction and used then against the Republic 3. The fact that many of the trained officer corps were on the nationalist side, allowed them to train and organise their forces and conscripts (including NCO schools, etc) far better or at least fast than the Republic. They also had the Falangist and Carlist militia who were trained along military lines (unlike the random anarchist and socialist militias). The other major factor was a single head of command (eventually Franco) who focussed all decisions and commands and sacked anyone who went against the plan. The Republican command was hamstrung by democracy, each and every decision had to be debated and discussed. Also the various factions - anarchist, Catalan, Basque, socialist, Communist all had their own opinions which had to be debated and discussed. 4. Certainly both sides armed merchantmen and the Basque navy was mostly armed trawlers

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  3. Re your third point. There may be better-sourced figures nowadays, but in George Hills' "The battle for Madrid" (Vantage Books, 1976) he estimates that the split in army officers at the time of the military-led uprising was thus: of 24 active service Major-Generals, only four joined the rebels, and 31 out of 68 Brigadier Generals, while junior officers split 65:35 in the rebels' favour. The Republic retained 24 of the Generals in its territory, "lost two to the enemy and gained two, imprisoned 8 and shot 15...The Nationalists retained 19...in their service (lost two and gained two), imprisoned 10 and shot 6. Of the 15,300 officers of field and junior rank in the active list (army and paramilitary forces) some 7300 found themselves in...the Republican zone... One thousand took refuge in embassies and consulates. The rest were gradually vetted... 1500 [suspected fascists]...were thereafter shot in batches. A like number of 'indiferentes' were imprisoned in the first place, though after a whole some were given minor commands. The remainder, 3500 'republicanos', were retained in military employment. Of the 7800 officers in the nationalist zones, 500 at least were shot, imprisoned or dismissed." Apparently a greater proportion of officers in the first reserve sided with the Republic. "In battle, the youth of the bulk of the Nationalist officers was to give their side am inestimable advantage."
    So it may have been more a matter of officers' youth and (in the case of the Army of Africa) combat experience that gave the Nationalists an edge, rather than simply a superiority in numbers.

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    1. Thankyou again for your input. Highly possible as far as shear numbers are concerned - I have read those figures elsewhere as far as who stayed where, etc. But The Republic suffered for a lack on unified command and their attempt to break the Rebles control by issuing the order then soldier need not obey thier officers actually missfired badly with Republican units breaking up and Rebel units having a more iron fist approach to disipline were able to hold those waverers to account. The unified command of the Rebels also quickly brought to heal the militias (Catholic and Falangist) under military command/discipline. The Republic took until May 1937 to reorganise (later still in Catalonia). The Rebels were also far quicker to reorganise training, to build a cadre of NCOs and junior officers to replace the fallen.

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